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ON INTERPRETING STRONG SUPERVENIENCE
Zachary J. Ernst, M.A.
Western Michigan University,_ 1996
Jaegwon Kim's definition of strong supervenience has found application in
such areas as the mind-body problem, aesthetics, morality, and the relationship
between physics and the special sciences. The main reason for the popularity of
supervenience is that it purportedly has a long laundry list of virtues. For instance, it
has been claimed that supervenience accounts are non-reductive, capable of empirical
verification, simple with respect to ontology, and explanatorily powerful.
In this paper, I examine Kim's definition of strong supervenience, arguing that
a fundamental ambiguity in the definition makes it impossible for strong
supervenience to possess all of these virtues simultaneously. This ambiguity stems
from the fact that Kim's definition is written in second-order quantified modal logic,
a logic which lacks a standard interpretation. I outline various ways in which we
might give a consistent interpretation to this definition. It is seen that each
interpretation forces the supervenience theorist to abandon certain purported virtues
of supervenience theory.
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INTRODUCTION
Supervenience has come to play a prominent role in recent philosophical
literature in widely diverse contexts. In moral philosophy, aesthetics, and perhaps
most importantly, in philosophy of mind, supervenience is often thought of as
representing the best hope of solving a broad class of problems. It is hoped that some
concept of supervenience can be used to explain the relationship between goodness
and the natural properties, beauty and physical properties, as well as between the
mental and the physical.
These problems come about when we try to reconcile two highly plausible
intuitions. On the one hand, many philosophers are sympathetic to the view that
physical properties are, in some sense, all that is 'really real.' Another way of putting
this position would be to say that a complete physical description of the world would
be complete in every respect. On the other hand, it is quite plausible to maintain that
mental, aesthetic, and moral properties are 'real' as well, and would somehow be left
of out of a purely physical description of the world.
Supervenience theory, by describing the relationship between physical and
non-physical, 'emergent' properties, has thus been latched onto as of tremendous
potential value. If we could arrive at a satisfactory account of supervenience, a large
number of classic philosophical problems could all be solved in one fell swoop.
1
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In addition, supervenience theory, it is commonly believed, can provide an
account which is in harmony with other areas of philosophical investigation. For
instance, many believe that supervenience accounts can avoid reductionism in the
arena of the psycho-physical, can allow us to maintain a simple ontology, can be
subjected to empirical verification, and can provide a meaningful, non-trivial
explanation.
Eager to arrive at an account of emergent properties, philosophers have begun
discussions about these specific purported virtues of supervenience. Discussions
about reductionism, the ontological status of supervenient properties, and their roles
in causal relations have been heated and numerous. But I believe that these sorts of
discussions are premature. It will not be my goal in this paper to discuss the viability
of specific supervenience claims, much less to attack or defend supervenience as a
whole. Rather, I will attempt to take a step back and examine important questions
with regard to the interpretation of Jaegwon Kim's definition of strong supervenience.
I will suggest that there are very deep and fundamental questions regarding its
interpretation. These questions must be resolved before more specific questions about
supervenience claims can be fruitfully addressed.
Another way of putting my programme is this: at present, discussions of
supervenience presuppose an understanding of what supervenience claims mean, and
set out to determine what they entail with regard to reductionism, the ontological
status of supervenience properties, and so on. My claim is that when we focus our
attention on the question of how to interpret the definition of strong supervenience,
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we find that we have no such understanding of what supervenience claims mean.
Thus, we must first arrive at a satisfactory interpretation of the definition.
As I have said, I will focus my attention on Jaegwon Kim's definition of
strong supervenience. The first section of my paper will therefore be devoted to
giving a brief overview of his weak, global and strong supervenience. I will give this
overview in order to justify my emphasis on strong supervenience. My justification
for using Kim's set of definitions is simply that it is this set which has been by far the
most influential. After this overview has been given, I will offer a formalized
definition of strong supervenience. The formalized definition allows us to more
clearly see where problems of interpretation arise.
I will explain in that section that these problems of interpretation stem from
the fact that Kim's definition of strong supervenience is written in second-order
quantified modal logic, a logic for which no interpretation has been agreed upon. In
this logic, modal claims are made with respect to properties. Without an
interpretation of this logic, it is far from obvious what exactly these modal claims
mean. As will be explained below, this problem is compounded by the fact that
Kim's definition employs both the so-called second and third grades of modal
involvement. That is, the second-order quantifications lie both inside and outside the
scope of modal operators. As Quine has forcefully argued, even in first-order
quantified modal logic, we must be very careful to differentiate between first and
second-grade modal involvements when interpreting formulae. I believe that a
similar caveat applies in this case.
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Thus, I will be concerned in the bulk of this paper with outlining how we
might interpret Kim's definition of strong supervenience. This will involve sorting
out the ontological commitments of second- and third-grade modal involvements in
second-order quantified modal logic. Toward this end, I will offer a background logic
from which we might begin such an examination. With the proper background logic
in place, it will be seen that when we make a consistent interpretation of Kim's
definition, we will not be able to simultaneously claim all of the purported virtues of
strong supervenience. That is, we will only be able to claim some of them at the cost
of abandoning others. Only when we come to accept this fact will we be able to
engage in fruitful discussion of other pressing issues regarding supervenience.

VARIETIES OF SUPERVENIENCE
In his paper entitled, "Concepts of Supervenience", Jaegwon Kim
differentiates between weak, global, and strong supervenience. In this chapter, I will
review Kim's distinctions, and justify my emphasis on strong supervenience. This
justification will be accomplished by showing how weak and global supervenience
are inadequate for most situations in which we would want to employ some concept
of supervenience. My justification for concentrating on Kim's formulations of
supervenience is simply that it is this set of definitions which is by far the most often
cited in recent philosophical literature.
Supervenience in General
Supervenience in general is a claim that a property (or family of properties) A
(call A the supervening properties) covaries with another property (or family of
properties) B (call B the supervenience base). Also implied by any concept of
supervenience is the claim that for any two objects x and y, and properties A and B, if
A supervenes on B then if x and y are identical with respect to B, then they are
identical with respect to A as well.
Kim credits G.E. Moore with originating this idea in the following passage,
which is quoted from Kim's "Concepts of Supervenience":
If a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain
5
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degree, then not only must that thing possess it, under all
circumstances, in the same degree, but also anything exactly like it
must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree.
(Kim, Concepts 54)
To adapt an example from R.M. Hare (Kim, Concepts 55), consider two men,
Smith and Jones, who are both in happy possession of all the same specific virtues
(say, honesty, benevolence, courage, piety, and prudence). If goodness supervenes on
the specific virtues, then it follows that Smith is good iff Jones is.
Weak Supervenience Defined
This leads us directly to the concept of weak supervenience which Kim
defines as follows:
WS A weakly supervenes on B if and only if necessarily, for any x and
y, if x and y share all properties in B, then x and y share all properties
in A --- that is, indiscernibility with respect to B entails indiscemibility
with respect to A. (Kim, Concepts 58)
It is easy to see that this definition captures the intuition expressed in the
above passage from G.E. Moore concerning the relationship between valuational and
physical properties.
Why call this 'weak supervenience'? As an answer to this question, consider
a situation in which all cars of the same make and model are the same color. All
Corvettes are red (say) and all Hondas are blue. It would follow that a car's color
weakly supervenes on its make and model. But this is completely compatible with
the existence of another possible world in which all Hondas are red and all Corvettes
are blue -- for in that world, too, all cars which are identical with respect to make and

model are also identical with respect to color. 1
So this is called 'weak supervenience' because it is too weak to support
interesting counterfactual claims. In the above case, for example, just because the
property of being red weakly supervenes on the property of being a Corvette, and all
Corvettes in one world are red, we are still unable to say anything regarding the color
of any specific Corvette in another possible world. For instance, we cannot say, 'had
this Honda been a Corvette, then it would have been red.' Thus, as its name implies,
weak supervenience is too weak to be of much use.
Global Supervenience Defined
So if we are to be able to make interesting counterfactual claims from
supervenience, we require a stronger definition. The failure of weak supervenience
suggests 'global supervenience,' which is defined by Kim as follows:
GS A globally supervenes on B just in case worlds that are
indiscernible with respect to B ("B-indiscernible" for short) are
A-indiscernible. (Kim, Concepts 68)
By making a specific trans-world claim, Kim originally hoped to be able to
support interesting counterfactuals. But this, as Kim himself admits, is not the case.
(Kim, Strong and Global 82)
To see this, consider the claim that minds globally supervene on brains.
Furthermore, let us assume that all people in the actual world have minds. Consider
another possible world, exactly like our own, except that in that world, Socrates has a
twin. These two worlds are no longer B-indiscernible. Thus, we could consistently
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hold that minds globally supervene on brains, but that in this other world in which
Socrates has a twin, there are no minds, and Socrates, his twin, and everyone else are
mindless robots. This is obviously unsatisfactory, so global supervenience must be
abandoned.2
Strong Supervenience Defined
The failure of global supervenience tells us that we require something yet
stronger. Thus, we are led to the final stop on our tour, strong supervenience.
Strong supervenience attempts to remedy the problems explained above
concerning counterfactuals by making liberal use of strategically-placed modal
operators and second-order quantifications. It is defined as follows:
SSA strongly supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x and
each property F in A, if x has F then there is a property G in B such
that x has G and necessarily if any y has G it has F. (Kim, Concepts
65)
This definition requires some explanation. Consider the Mona Lisa (x), and
assume that the beauty of paintings (A) strongly supervenes on their physical
properties (B). The definition of strong supervenience requires that there is a
sufficient reason why the Mona Lisa is beautiful, and that this reason can be
expressed in terms of its relevant physical properties (i.e. some G in B). Furthermore,
if any other painting (any y) had exactly those physical properties, then necessarily, it
too would be beautiful in exactly the same way that the Mona Lisa is (that is, 'D(\f
y)(Gy--+ Fy).' Because the concept of necessity is used within this definition, we are
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guaranteed the truth of claims in the subjunctive mood such as 'if my painting had all
the same physical properties of the Mona Lisa, then it too would have been
beautiful.' 3
This concept of supervenience does not fall prey to the problems of weak and
global supervenience. Consider our first example of redness weakly supervening on
the property of being a Corvette. If redness had strongly supervened on the property
of being a Corvette, then all Corvettes in all possible worlds would be red as well.
Strong supervenience also does not fall prey to the problems of global supervenience,
because it does not restrict itself to worlds that are B-indiscemible. The possible
existence or counterfactual properties of other paintings makes no difference to the
beauty of the Mona Lisa, or any other possible painting with the physical properties
of the Mona Lisa.
It is this virtue of strong supervenience which makes it the focus of so much
attention, and thus the focus of my attention as well. For example, for a philosopher
of mind, it is a virtue of an account of the mind that we are able to make
counterfactual claims about possible, but not actual, minds and bodies. After all, if
we could not make such claims, then prospects of artificial intelligence researchers
would be dim at best. In ethics as well, assuming that goodness supervenes on the
specific virtues, it would be highly desirable to be able to make such claims as, 'Jones
has no virtues at all. But if he had possessed all the specific virtues, then he would
have been good.' Weak and global supervenience do not allow us to unconditionally
make such claims; only strong supervenience will do. Hence, for the remainder of
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this paper, I will confine my discussion to strong supervenience.
A Formal Definition of Strong Supervenience
A quick reading of SS in the previous section will probably not reveal any
potential defects. Applications of this definition will seem at first to be
straightforward and contentful. However, I will argue that such applications are never
straightforward, and often not contentful. When we make supervenience claims, a
shallow understanding of the definition encourages us to not consider the
metaphysical and semantical entailments of such claims. The first step toward such
an understanding is through the analysis of the formalized definition, which is given
below (taken from (Horgan, 567)):
SS,

□(Vx)(VFEA){Fx-+ (:3GE8)[Gx & D(V y)(Gy-+Fy)]}

The formal definition SS, allows us to more clearly see a few unusual features.
First of all, the first 'D' is used in the so-called 'second grade of modal involvement'
in which it is placed outside the scope of a quantification (making the formula 'wide
scope'). Adding to the confusion, SS, also contains the 'third grade of modal
involvement' (because the 'D' is inside the scope of '(::lG)'). 4 These quantifications
in themselves, aside from their modal involvements, are unusual as well, for they are
second-order quantifications. In themselves, neither a second-grade modal
involvement nor a second-order quantification are inherently problematic; even Quine
will allow the second-grade of modal involvement under some restrictions. The third
grade of modal involvement, of course, has been vehemently attacked by Quine as
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being incoherent (Quine, Paradox). However, even ifwe do not oppose the third
grade ofmodal involvement, interesting questions are raised when we place a
second-order quantification outside or inside the scope ofa modal operator.
First, there is an ambiguity surrounding the interpretation ofany necessity
claim. When we assert that 'D p' (where p may be atomic or complex), we could
intend to use 'D' as expressing nomological, de re, or dicto necessity.5 lfwe intend to
employ nomological necessity, then by '□(Pc)' we mean 'it is a consequence of
natural law that Pc.' By de re necessity, we would interpret the same formula as 'it is
in the essence ofc to display P.' Lastly, ifwe use de dicto necessity, then we mean 'it
is an analytic truth that Pc.'
Assaults on each ofthese versions ofnecessity are notorious, especially those
due to Quine concerning analyticity (Quine, Dogmas) and de re necessity. But for the
purpose ofthis paper, I prefer not to enter this thicket. I will grant that it is indeed in
the essence ofhuman beings to possess a certain genetic structure, that 'all bachelors
are unmarried' is an analytic truth, and that it is a nomologically necessary truth that
'unsupported objects, heavier than air, will fall when near the surface ofthe earth.'
Rather, what I would like to accomplish is to outline the ramifications ofeach of
these three kinds ofnecessity for supervenience claims.
The inconsistent use ofwide and narrow scope in SSr emphasizes these
ambiguities. This is because the interpretations for wide and narrow scope
correspond to the distinction between de re and de dicto necessity. When the modal
operator falls outside the scope ofa quantification (wide scope), the formula is
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interpreted de dicto. That is, the necessity claim is said to attach to a sentence, and
necessity is then understood as analyticity or tautology. On the other hand, when the
operator is within the scope of a quantification (narrow scope), then the formula is
interpreted de re. In the latter case, necessity is understood to attach to things, and
implies that the sentence asserts of a thing that it has·its essence (or denies that it does
not have its essence).
Although this inconsistent use of wide and narrow scope does not introduce
any outright contradictions into the definition of strong supervenience, it does imply
that the supervenience theorist is committed to an equivocal reading of 'necessity.'
For if wide scope corresponds to de dicto necessity while narrow scope corresponds
to de re necessity, then supervenience claims imply de dicto necessity with respect to
the supervening properties, and de re necessity with respect to the supervenience base.
Thus, without an understanding of how different readings of necessity will impact
supervenience claims, the inconsistent use of wide and narrow scope is doubly
unwarranted: first, because we do not understand the implications of wide or narrow
scope for supervenience claims, secondly because we do not know if an inconsistent
use of wide and narrow scope will have undesirable repercussions on supervenience
claims.
So the task ahead is to delineate different ways in which this massively
ambiguous definition can be disambiguated. This is an important project, for whether
we choose de re, de dicto, or nomological necessity, we will find that this choice
places severe demands upon our ontology, and will thus impact the claims which
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supervenience theorists can consistently make. I will turn to de dicta, de re, and
nomological necessity in tum. Prior to this discussion, however, it will be useful to
have in place a set of metaphysical conceptions of properties.

INTERPRETATIONS OF NECESSITY
As I have indicated above, the ambiguities which plague interpretation of the
'D' operator call for an examination of each possible interpretation, with special
consideration on how such interpretations affect the ontological status of properties. I
will turn in the first section of this chapter to a consideration of the ontological status
of properties. After this is in place, I will use these considerations in a discussion of
the interpretations of necessity.
The Ontological Status of Properties
A wide variety of conceptions of the ontological status of properties have been
held. These may be characterized as being along a spectrum which runs from Plato to
the nominalists. Following Mario Bunge's characterization of these positions, I will
call them 'strong,' 'moderate,' and 'weak':
strong: Properties, whether intrinsic [unary] or mutual [relational], are real,
nay supremely real, and individuals only exemplify them.
moderate: Whereas intrinsic [unary] properties are real, mutual [relational]
properties are not.
weak: All properties, whether intrinsic or mutual [unary or relational] are
unreal: only individuals are real. (Bunge, 100)
It is easy to see that the strong conception of properties is Plato's view:
properties have an existence which is completely independent of our conceptions of
them, and would exist even if they were never exemplified. The moderate view most
14
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likely evolved in an attempt to discredit the so-called 'Cambridge Changes' -
purported changes in a thing which result from its losing or gaining a trivial relational
property such as 'being at such-and-such a distance from Alpha Centauri.' The weak
conception is consistent with a nominalist view, diametrically opposed to Plato, but
possibly in line with the late Wittgenstein, that denies the existence of propositions
entirely (and thus of the properties out of which propositions are constructed).
I will focus on the two extreme conceptions, strong and weak, in order to
simplify the discussion. Although supervenience, if it is a viable concept, would most
likely employ many relational properties, discussions of supervenience most often are
simplified through the exclusion of these properties. Also, we can easily subsume
relational properties under unary properties by substituting for 'Fab' the sentence
'F*a' where 'F*x' is read as 'x has the property of F-ing B.'
These two positions regarding the ontological status of properties immediately
suggest the first distinction we must keep in mind when interpreting the definition of
strong supervenience, namely:
1. PY: Yes, properties exist. They may not reside in a Platonic realm of
forms, but they have an independent existence.
2. PN: No, properties do not exist. Properties are words which denote a set of
individuals which humans have grouped together for some purpose or other. They
have no independent existence aside from the use of our language, and the sets into
which we collect objects.
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At this point, we may disambiguate the language which I have used thus far.
From here on in, I will use the word 'property' only when operating within the PY
conception. When operating within PN, I will use the term 'predicate.' This follows
standard usage, in which a predicate is taken to mean a phrase such as 'is red,' which
can be used to construct a proposition. A property is (loosely speaking) a
characteristic which an object might possess; predicates are merely speech acts with
which we collect things into sets.
Necessity De Dicto
Because the task of this paper is to examine the metaphysical and semantical
entailments of supervenience claims, the definition SSr must be revised. This is
because of its use of both wide and narrow scope. As it is plainly incoherent in
general to adopt one set of ontological commitments with respect to the properties in
B and another set of commitments with respect to the properties in A, we need to
revise SSr in order to make its use of modalities consistent. Therefore, at this point, I
must explicate a background logic which will enable us to make these revisions
without at the same time conflating wide and narrow scope.
Kripke's Modified QS5
As I have said above, it is not my intention in this paper to enter into a
discussion about the possible meaninglessness of de re or de dicto claims. Rather, I
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will assume that such claims can be (and often are) meaningful. My intention is
simply to outline how supervenience claims are affected by de re, de dicto, or
nomological interpretations of' □.' Thus, it would be helpful to employ as a
background logic a system which allows for each interpretation of' □,' without
conflating them.
To do this, I will employ Kripke semantics as revised in 1963. The reason for
excluding the original version ofKripke semantics is that it is too permissive for my
purposes here. That is, originally, Kripke's quantified modal logic (call it QSS0)
allowed derivation of the Barcan and converse Barcan formulae (Konyndyk, 94-5):
BF (ef x)□Px-+D(\f x)Px
CBF □(ef x)Px-+(ef x)□Px
BF and CBF tell us that QSS0 is too strong. This is because, ifwe allow BF
and CBF, then a de re claim will be true ifand only if the corresponding de dicto
claim is true. But de re claims carry vastly stronger ontological commitments than de
dicto claims. Thus, if we allow BF and CBF, then there will be no real difference
between the claim that a sentence is analytically true, and the claim that a thing
possesses a property essentially, for BF and CBF tell us that one claim is true only if
the other is true as well. So if the move from analyticity to essentialism (and vice
versa) is permitted, then we will not be able to even begin to address questions of how
to interpret the definition of strong supervenience; all interpretations will entail the
ontological commitments of all other interpretations.
So we do not want our background logic to be this permissive. But on the
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other hand, neither do we want it to be too austere. That is, we want for de dicto and
de re claims (wide scope and narrow scope formulae) to be permissible, but we do not
want a de re claim to be derivable from a de dicto claim, or vice-versa.
Kripke's modified semantics walks this line quite nicely. In this system (call
it QSS r), BF and CBF are permissible (that is, do not entail inconsistencies), but are
not derivable. So we are permitted to write formulae with either wide or narrow
scope (corresponding to de dicto and de re, accordingly), but we cannot derive one
from the other. 6 The system QSSr will therefore serve our purposes quite well by
allowing us to keep de re and de dicto claims separate, yet still allowing us to
examine both varieties of formulae. Thus, I will be assuming QSSr for the remainder
of this paper.
A De Dicto Formulation of SS
With QSSr as a background logic, we are permitted to write the following
revised formulation of Ss,:
SS/ □(Vx)(VFEA){Fx➔ D(:3GE8)[Gx & (V y)(Gy➔ Fy)]}
In SS/, we have moved the second' □' to a position to the left of '(:3G),'
which makes it wide scope. The definition is now consistent in its use of second
grade modal involvement. Assuming QSS., we are assured that SS/ is a wff. With
this assurance, we can now tum to the question of its interpretation.
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Interpreting the De Dicto Formulation
Would supervenience theorists be happy with SS/? Consider that for a
proposition to be necessary de dicto, it must be analytic.7 A sentence is analytic only
when the meaning of the predicate is contained (as Kant writes in the First Critique)
in the meaning of the subject, such as in 'all bachelors are male.' Keeping this in
mind, let us return to the definition of strong supervenience for a moment,
considering the claim that A strongly supervenes on B:
SS A strongly supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x
and each property F in A, if x has F then there is a property Gin B
such that x has Gand necessarily if any y has Git has F.
If SS is to be interpreted de dicto, then the definition of strong supervenience
could be restated as follows:
SD A strongly supervenes on B just in case for each predicate F in A
the meaning of 'F' contains the meaning of a disjunction, one of whose
disjuncts is Gin B, and the meaning of 'G' contains the meaning of
'F'.
But if SD is the best way to interpret strong supervenience claims, then the
concept of strong supervenience has become trivial. Such investigations would be
merely investigations into the meanings of words, and could all be resolved by appeal
to dictionaries. Supervenience would be a waste of time to at least the degree to
which it would be a waste of time to conduct a survey of bachelors to determine how
many were unmarried.
The triviality of supervenience claims results from a de dicto reading of

necessity because in such a reading, our ontology has become too impoverished to
carry out interesting investigations. If there are no properties, and only predicates,
then everything hinges on the meanings of words. If everything is allowed to hinge
on the meaning of words, then investigations into supervenience will be rendered
trivial. 8 It would be unfair to supervenience theorists to leave their situation like this;
yet it is interesting to note that SSr's use of wide scope with regard to the supervening
property F gives this reading a certain level of plausibility.
Necessity De Re
In the discussion above, we saw that an interpretation of 'D' as 'it is
analytically true that...' is unsatisfactory.9 In this section, I will examine a few
possible de re interpretations of a revised version of SS, which is given here:
SS/ ('v'x)('v'FEA)□ {Fx➔ (:3GE8 )D[Gx & ('v' y)(Gy➔ Fy)]}
Assuming QSS., we are again guaranteed that SS/ is at least well-formed, and
doesn't generate inconsistencies in our background logic. Again, we tum to the
question of interpretation. Here, I will focus on two possible interpretations,
beginning with a strongly Platonist interpretation, and then moving to a more
moderate reading. My goal here is not to exhaust all possible de re interpretations,
but to define a spectrum into which most interpretations will fall.

20
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A Platonist Reading of Necessity De Re
The major challenge in interpreting the formal definition SS{ lies in the fact
that, unlike an ordinary de re claim, this one is a claim about properties. That is, this
formulation of Kim's definition of strong supervenience forces us to consider the
ontological implications of the claim that properties necessarily stand in certain
relationships to each other. As we saw above, by reading 'D' as expressing
analyticity, we would impoverish our ontology to the point at which no interesting
non-linguistic claims can be made. One obvious way to avoid this consequence is to
go to the opposite extreme and consider a Platonist ontology in which properties are
"supremely real" (Bunge, 100).
Operating from within a Platonist perspective, it is easy to see how a claim
such as 'goodness strongly supervenes on the specific virtues' might run. In the
dialogues, Socrates examines the question of the unity of the virtues. Most notably in
the Protagoras, Socrates comes to the conclusion that a man is good iff he is in
possession of the five specific virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, and
holiness. Without belaboring the point, I think that it is obvious that Plato would hold
that it is a necessary truth that only those men in possession of the specific virtues are
good. Thus, Plato would be able to accept the thesis that goodness strongly
supervenes on the specific virtues, so long as we understand the relevant necessity
claim as attaching to the Platonic forms, which exist in a mind-independent reality.
This picture of necessity in second-order quantified modal logic (call it
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'2QSS') is diametrically opposed to the view which emerged from a reading of 'D' as
analyticity. Our ontology has not been diminished in the slightest, and there is no
way in which we might hold that the supervening properties are unreal. Rather, they
are "supremely real," more real, in fact, than ordinary objects in the world.
However, we pay a high price for the ability to hold onto the reality of
supervening properties. Certainly, most contemporary philosophers would be
uncomfortable with this solution; the cure may be worse than the disease. For in
order to use this conception of properties, we would have to answer objections from
everyone from Parmenides to D.M. Armstrong. Operating under the assumption that
any philosophical 'solution' which forces us to answer classic philosophical problems
is unsatisfactory, we require a more moderate realist view of properties.
Natural Kinds
For a more acceptable view of the ontological status of properties, we may
turn to the doctrine of natural kinds. Those who accept that there are natural kinds are
committed to metaphysical realism (Wilkerson, 30), but this metaphysical realism is
vastly weaker than Platonism. The doctrine of natural kinds is fully compatible with
the view that properties have no mind-independent existence, in Plato's sense. Such a
metaphysical realist can hold that the entities studied by physics constitute 'all there
.

lS.

'
Philosophers such as Quine and Putnam who accept that there are natural
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kinds require only that nature has 'joints' at which it may be carved. The things of
the world, which may be as diverse as tigers, gold, and electrons, fall into categories
in such a way as to allow science to limn the nature of reality. Putnam sums up the
doctrine of natural kinds with the following two ideas:
1. To belong to a natural kind, something must have the same
composition, or obey the same laws --- indeed, what makes
composition important, when it is, is its connection with laws of
behavior --- as model members of the class, and this composition or
these laws are not usually known when the natural kind term is
introduced, but require an indeterminate amount of investigation to
discover.
2. Natural kind terms and proper names are not synonymous with
conjunctions of criteria and definite descriptions respectively.
(Putnam, 74)
For example, whether or not a metal is gold depends on whether its essence is
the same as the essence of paradigmatic samples of gold. In this example, the essence
of gold is its atomic structure. Thus, the property of 'being gold' can be cashed out as
'having such-and-such an atomic structure.'
Although the doctrine of natural kinds revives Aristotelian essences, it does
allow us to avoid the extravagant ontology of Plato. This is because it is not the
property (say) of 'being gold' which is 'really real.' Rather, it is the atomic structure
shared by sample of gold which is 'really real.' So the doctrine of natural kinds
permits us to walk a very fine line. That is, some things really are (say) gold, but only
because they share a certain atomic structure, and not through participation in a
Platonic Form.
So if we are to interpret the properties in SS{ as denoting membership in a
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natural kind, we are not committed to Plato's two-realm ontology, with its attendant
set of difficulties. Furthermore, we are not reducing the necessity claim to mere
analyticity, which would trivialize investigations into supervenience. This is because
properties, on this view, are 'real,' but only because they denote membership in a set
whose objects necessarily have certain essences.
So have we arrived at an interpretation of strong supervenience which allows
us to keep all the virtues which supervenience theorists want? Predictably, I think
that the answer is an unqualified 'no.' To see this, let us recap the natural kinds
interpretation of strong supervenience.
First, on this view, properties are not 'really real'; rather they denote
membership in a natural kind. Second, both the supervenient family of properties and
the supervenience base are natural kinds. 10 Third, there is a necessary connection
between an object having a supervening property and having a base property.
The problem for supervenience theorists is that these are sufficient conditions
for reductionism. To see this, it would be helpful to take a step back and consider an
argument due to Jaegwon Kim to the effect that reductionism always obtains between
a supervenient and subvenient domain (Kim, Nomological). Kim's argument fails in
general. However, if we add the premise that the properties in the supervenience and
subvenient domains are natural kinds, then the argument will go through.
Kim asks us to consider, for two domains A and B, such that A supervenes on
B, the sets of A-maximal and B-maximal properties (call them A* and B*). Consider
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two objects, x and y, such that x and y share the same B-maximal property, call it Q.
It follows immediately from any definition of supervenience that x and y must share
the same A-maximal property, call it R. Assuming that A* and B* are finite, then
there must be a finite set of B-maximal properties which will 'cause' 11 any given
A-maximal property to be instantiated. So we can easily construct one-half of the
biconditional which is required for a reduction of A to B.
The converse follows as well. To deny the converse would be to claim that
some object x could have a property R in A*, and yet not have any property Q in B *,
where Q is a sufficient condition for the instantiation of R. But this contradicts the
assumption that A supervenes on B, for to make such a supervenience claim is to
assert that each R in A* has a sufficient 'cause' which is some Q in B*. That is, for
each property in A*, at least one property in B* must be instantiated in x, and it is the
subvenient property which accounts for x's having the supervenient property. So if
we take the disjunction of Q's in B* which could form a supervenience base for R,
then that disjunction will be a necessary condition for R.
So what we are left with is a biconditional for each supervenient property R in
A*:

Kim stops here, claiming that the existence of such biconditionals is sufficient
for reductionism. But this is not the case. Jerry Fodor, in his article entitled Special
Sciences, gives compelling reasons why the existence of such a biconditional is not

sufficient for reductionism.
According to Fodor, there is a feature of such biconditionals which forces
them to fall short of providing a full-blown reduction. This is the fact that such
biconditionals are massively disjunctive. For Fodor, this indicates that the predicates
on at least one side of the biconditional are not natural kinds and that the
biconditional will not support counterfactuals. That it will not support
counterfactuals is because a predicate which does not denote a natural kind may be
instantiated by any number of predicates on the other side of the biconditional. Thus,
when constructing such a massively disjunctive biconditional, we can never be
guaranteed that the list of predicates on either side is complete. Hence, the
biconditional might not be satisfied under counterfactual circumstances. Because a
minimal criterion for lawlikeness requires that counterfactuals be supported, such
biconditionals fail to be laws. This shows that reductionism does not obtain in these
cases.
To illustrate how Fodor's objection blocks reductionism, consider an example
from the philosophy of science. The question of whether biology reduces to
chemistry is a hotly contested issue. Alexander Rosenberg has recently argued in
Instrumental Biology or the Disunity ofScience that it is impossible for human beings
to achieve a reduction of biological kinds to chemical kinds. The reason for this,
according to Rosenberg, is that the kinds with which biology is concerned reflect
"human needs, interests, and limits" (Rosenberg, 5). By this account, our needs,
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interests, and limits force biologists to organize biological kinds according to their
function, not their structure. However, biological functions do not correspond in any
systematic way to chemical structure. Hence, a single biological kind may be
instantiated by a heterogenous disjunction of different chemical structures. So we see
that, because natural kinds are given by their structures, biological kinds cannot be
natural.
Chemical kinds, on the other hand, are natural kinds. This is entirely in line
with Putnam's characterization of natural kinds given above, for chemical kinds are
determined by their structures, and it is their structures which are essential to
chemicals. 12 On Fodor and Rosenberg's view, the fact that biological kinds are not
natural while chemical kinds are natural is the feature of biology and chemistry which
blocks reduction. For it is owing to this fact that any purported bridge law which
attempts to reduce biology to chemistry will be wildly disjunctive.
However, Fodor's objection is blocked in this case. First, we are assuming
that the predicates denote membership in a natural kind. Second, because we are
concerned only with strong supervenience, the support of counterfactuals is
guaranteed. So we are left with the fact that the biconditional under consideration is
lawlike after all. Therefore, the biconditional does qualify as a bridge law, and we
have a full-blown reduction of A to B.
In the light of Fodor's quite plausible qualms about calling massively
disjunctive biconditionals 'laws,' it may seem odd to use the previous argument to

imply that (say) the mental can be reduced to the neurological. After all, such a
bridge 'law' may very well contain literally a billion disjuncts. But this does not tell
against my argument. Rather, I think that this unpalatable conclusion indicates that in
the case of the mental supervening on the neurological, it is unreasonable to take
neurological predicates as natural kinds. 13 That is, we are better off treating this
argument as a reductio ad absurdum of the premise that neurological kinds are natural
kinds.
To round off the discussion, we can note that interpretation of predicates as
natural kinds entails that we read 'D' as nomological necessity. As we have seen, if
predicates are natural kinds, then for each strong supervenience claim, we can (in
principle) derive a reductionary law reducing the supervenient to the subvenient.
Thus, the necessity claim must be taken as meaning that there is a lawlike equivalence
between the supervenient and the subvenient. This is entirely in keeping with the
concept of natural kinds, for an object is a token of a natural kind iff it obeys certain
laws (see Putnam's first criteria for membership in a natural kind, given above).
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CONCLUSION
I admit that I am often baffled by supervenience claims, particularly with
regard to the mind-body problem. In this paper I have attempted to explain why I am
so baffled.
One way to recap my argument is through a thought-experiment. Consider a
clever philosopher who has established, beyond a doubt, that the mind strongly
supervenes on the body. Suppose that we were able to have a conversation with this
philosopher. No doubt, we would say something like, "So now you can answer a
burning question. What is the nature of the mind? Is it 'really real,' or is mind-talk
just abbreviated brain-talk? Does your discovery rule out dualism, or does it imply it?
Does the mind have causal powers? And can we reduce the mental to the physical?"
Surely, any good account of the mind should be able at least to address these
sorts of questions. However, I am unable to find anything in the concept of strong
supervenience which can even begin to. This, I have argued, is because the primitives
in the definition, namely, the properties and necessity operators, are left hopelessly
ambiguous. But this ambiguity has not prevented supervenience theorists from
making grandiose claims about the virtues of supervenience theory.
In this paper, I have outlined in broad form how we might start to
disambiguate strong supervenience. It was seen that each disambiguation forces the
supervenience theorist to give up certain purported virtues of supervenience theory.
29
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We may summarize the possible positions as follows:
1. Necessity is analyticity, and properties are actually predicates, or speech
acts.
2. Necessity is to be understood de re, and because properties necessarily
stand in certain relations to one another, properties have a human-independent
existence somewhat akin to Platonism.
3. Necessity is to be understood as nomological. Properties denote
membership in a natural kind.
Under the first reading, supervenience claims are rendered trivial, because
they only apply to speech acts. We also get a sort of trivial 'linguistic reduction.'
The second view gets around the difficulties of the first, but at a tremendous cost in
ontological simplicity. We are committed to some variant of Platonism, and we must
therefore resolve all the philosophical problems which have plagued that view for
thousands of years. On the third view, our ontology remains simple, and our
investigations are not trivial, but we cannot avoid reductionism.
How this trilemma would be resolved will depend upon one's individual
preferences. The Churchlands, for instance, would be quite happy to accept this
position, because they could rest comfortably on the first horn of the trilemma. On
their view, mind-talk is abbreviated brain-talk, so necessity is analyticity and minds
are not 'really real.' A moral realist, on the other hand, could accept the second horn,
and would say something like, 'So goodness does tum out to be 'really real' after all.'
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Anyone trying to naturalize philosophy who accepted reductionism in the particular
case under consideration could easily accept the third horn.
These are all reasonable responses to my argument. What is an unreasonable
response is to make blanket statements about the many and varied virtues of
supervenience theory. Instead, we should face up to the old maxim that 'You pays
your money and you takes your choice.'

ENDNOTES
1.

Compare with (Kim, Concepts 59-60).

2.

Compare with (Kim, Strong and Global 83-4) where Kim writes, "It is
difficult to see how, given worlds like these, F's global supervenience on G
could support G--F subjunctives or counterfactuals..."

3.

Compare with Kim's example of Saint Francis in (Kim, Concepts 65-6).

4.

At first glance, this formula seems to be using the second grade throughout,
because the'□' appears to the left of'(Vy).' But it is important to keep in
mind that the relevant quantification is over the predicate G. Therefore,
because the necessity operator occurs within the scope of'(::JG),' this formula
uses both the second-grade of modal involvement as well as the third.

5.

Kim identifies four possible interpretations of necessity: "metaphysical,
logico-mathematical, analytic, and nomological" (Kim, Philosophical Concept
141) and goes on to say that the meaning of'necessity' should be left
"unfixed... to be interpreted to suit specific supervenience claims." I am
subsuming metaphysical necessity under the heading of'de re,' analytic under
'de dicto,' and assuming that logico-mathematical necessity is a variety of
analytic necessity, and thus can be treated under the heading of'de dicto.'
Obviously, I disagree with his second claim.

6.

Kripke accomplished this by noting that in order to derive BF and CBF, it is
necessary to employ the reiteration S5 rule on a sentence with a free variable.
By prohibiting use of this rule on unbound formulae, derivations of BF and
CBF are blocked.

7.

I am excluding tautologies and synthetic a priori truths from consideration.
Whatever a supervenience claim means, I think that it is obviously not a
tautology. I am excluding synthetic a priori truths from the discussion
because if supervenience claims are synthetic a priori, then this would imply
that we could determine which properties supervene on other properties a
priori, without empirical investigation. This is a highly dubious proposition,
especially with regard to the mind-body problem.

32

33
8.

Of course, some ordinary language philosophers would want to return to the
days of "O.E.D. is Q.E.D.", and this would be a good way to accomplish this.
But I will not give such views serious consideration here.

9.

Although I will indicate in chapter four that some philosophers of mind would
probably not object to this reading at all.

10.

Of course, we might be tempted to claim that the supervening family is
comprised of natural kinds while the supervenience base is not. However,
there is a problem with this which relates to what we might call 'transitive
supervenience.' For example, consider the claim that goodness supervenes on
psychological states, and psychological states supervene on brain states. If we
use a double standard, and claim that the supervenient family is composed of
natural kinds while the supervenience base is not, then we are committed to
the view that psychological states both are and are not to be understood as
natural kinds.

11.

It is highly problematic to use the word 'cause' here, because what Kim calls
'supervenient causation' may fail criteria for Humean causation. We may
substitute 'brings about' or some such phrase for 'causes.'

12.

See (Rosenberg, 20-6) for a more detailed analysis of why reductionism fails
in the case of biology and chemistry.

13.

And perhaps mental predicates are not natural kinds, either. See (Rorty) for a
sustained discussion of the artificiality of mental predicates.
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